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Regulatory Values and the Exceptions
Process
Tension between demands for generalized rules and for individualized
application of law is characteristic of any legal system. The generality
inherent in rules promotes predictability, efficiency, and equal treatment.
But even detailed rules often fail to take into account the full variety of
situations to which they arguably apply.1 The Anglo-American legal tra-
dition permits the judicial system considerable latitude to adjust rules to
fit individual cases.2 The highly rigid and specific provisions that often
characterize regulatory rules, however, allow little room for such individu-
alized justice.' The persistent occurrence of special cases, in which giving
a rule its usual effect would conflict with important policies or legal prin-
ciples, is an inevitable consequence of such rules.
Two principal procedural mechanisms are available to administrative
agencies to tailor the application of statutory and administrative rules to
special cases. Under "dispensatory" discretion, an agency addresses special
cases on an ad hoc basis, often without statutory or regulatory authoriza-
tion to do so. Under the other mechanism, an "exceptions process," an
agency considers applications for waivers, exemptions, or variances from a
rule in a procedure that incorporates limited protections for applicants
and other affected parties.
This Note analyzes the problem posed by special cases in light of the
values underlying administrative legal norms. The Note argues that, to
give the fullest effect to these values, administrators must exercise discre-
tion in special cases, and can best do so through an exceptions process
rather than through dispensatory discretion. The Note then briefly exam-
ines the actual operation of a particular exceptions process. In conclusion,
the Note proposes that Congress and agencies should favor inclusion of an
exceptions process in systems of rules, and that courts should construe
regulatory statutes presumptively as providing for an exceptions process.
1. See R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 48-63 (1954); Hart, Posi-
tivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 627-29 (1958).
2. See R. POUND, supra note 1, at 64 (discussing, inter alia, equitable discretion, flexible legal
standards such as duty of care and good faith, and range of sentencing under penal statutes); see also
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 28-29 (1977) (important aspect of common law decision-
making is flexibility that results from judicial discretion to choose among broad legal principles).
3. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UN-
REASONABLENESS 25 (1982); Aman, Adninistrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Adininistra-
tive Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 288-92. Such provisions often characterize statutory rules as well as
administrative ones. See infra pp. 941-42; see also Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 418-20 (1981) (trend toward definite, specific resolution of policy issues
in regulations and regulatory statutes).
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I. THE SPECIAL CASE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Problem of the Special Case
The special case occurs persistently in administrative law because the
rules that agencies administer frequently extend by their literal terms to
circumstances which rulemakers failed to anticipate.4 Where these unfore-
seen circumstances generate a conflict between the explicit prescription of
the rule and other important purposes implicit in the rule or embodied
elsewhere, both the agency and the regulated party may find it inappro-
priate or unfair to apply the rule.5 Isolated hardships and conflicts among
laws and policies may arise even when the uniform application of rules
makes sense in the vast majority of cases. Attempts to tailor statutory or
4. Several specific characteristics of a rule may generate special cases. Because of imprecise lan-
guage, the complexity of the regulated environment, or the failure of rulemakers to anticipate future
events, the rule may apply overbroadly. The rule may also conflict in isolated instances with other
laws or policies. See R. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE 48-54 (1978); Schuck, When the Exception
Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions
Process, 9-23 (November, 1983) (Final Report to the Admin. Conf. of the U.S.) (forthcoming in
DUKE L.J.). This Note will confine the definition of special cases to instances where the interests of a
private party are affected by the decision whether to apply the rule. The problem of the special case is
closely related to the problem of interpreting rules in borderline cases. Both types of cases are often in
some sense unanticipated by the original rulemakers. But in the special case, a rule can only be
interpreted awkwardly, if at all, to fit the situation. The special case should also be distinguished from
a situation in which the number of unanticipated cases of a certain type, or their significance for
agency policy, is so great that more generalized legislative or administrative rulemaking is preferable
to individualized special treatment. See Schuck, supra, at 194-99; Comment, The Exceptions Process:
the Administrative Counterpart to a Court of Equity and the Dangers it Presents to the Rulemaking
Process, 30 EMORY L.J. 1135, 1138 (1982). See generally Dickinson, The Problem of the Unprovided
Case, in 2 RECUEIL D'ETUDES SUR LES SOURCES DE DROIT EN L'HONNEUR DE F. GENY 503, 503
(1934) (discussing approaches to "the case which does not fall squarely and obviously within the
terms of a statute or rule established by precedent"); Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation:
The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925 (1960) (discussing need to
individualize administration of justice in systems of law).
5. For example, strict application of price controls can force some companies out of business,
undermining the regulatory aim of fair and efficient allocation of resources and unjustifiably burden-
ing those affected. See A. WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY: THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE OF
1971, at 81-82 (1973) (discussing plight of Kentucky Transport Company, which government denied
exception from price controls although company had raised wages shortly before existence of controls
in reliance on negotiated but pending increase in prices). Uniform application of industry-wide stan-
dards for pollution control may impose costs greater than those rulemakers would favor for firms in
unusual circumstances, and thus conflict with economic objectives of growth and high employment. In
the early 1970's, for example, imposition of controls on water pollution from a Reserve Mining Com-
pany plant in Minnesota could have led "to closing down 20 percent of the nation's taconite produc-
tion, unemployment of 3200 persons, and the economic devastation of the one-industry town of Silver
Bay, Minnesota (population 3,272)." B. ACKERMAN, S. ROsE-AcKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HEN-
DERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 322 (1974). A statute or rule
that sets out specific classifications of individuals entitled to a scarce governmental benefit, such as an
immigration visa, will probably fail to anticipate all instances in which granting the benefit would
conform to the purposes of the statute and be fairest to the applicants. To minimize this danger, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service administers several waivers or similar discretionary mecha-
nisms in the regulations for granting visas. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982) (granting Attorney
General discretion to admit temporarily aliens who are applying for nonimmigrant visas); 8 U.S.C. §
1182(h) (1982) (granting Attorney General authority to waive excludability in instances of "extreme
hardship" for certain aliens convicted of crimes or engaged in prostitution).
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administrative rules to fit every contingency by making them more de-
tailed often precipitate additional anomalous situations.' Making rules
less precise to accommodate unanticipated circumstances detracts from
their guiding force for regulators and private parties.7
B. Methods for Addressing Special Cases
This Note divides the institutional mechanisms that agencies use to ad-
dress exceptional cases into two categories. On the one hand, an agency
may assume discretionary authority to act on an ad hoc basis to adjust the
way rules apply in special cases. This form of adjustment, which this
Note will call dispensatory discretion,8 most typically occurs when agency
officials simply decide not to enforce a rule or a statutory provision in
what they consider to be special circumstances. 9 A general regulatory es-
cape clause may in fact authorize such discretion,10 but if the clause is
6. See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983)
(greater definition in a rule increases the risk of unintended over- or under-inclusiveness); G. GIL-
MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977) ("[T]he more tightly a statute was drafted origi-
nally, the more difficult it becomes to adjust the statute to changing conditions without legislative
revision.") (footnote omitted).
7. See Diver, supra note 6, at 72 (vague rules entail additional expense to determine their mean-
ing); Erlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STuD. 257, 265-66
(1974) (discretionary "standards" generate confusion over interpretation in comparison with specific
rules). Of course, small interpretative manipulations of specific elements of detailed rules may help an
agency achieve its primary objectives. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 123-51 (advo-
cating concept of "good inspector," analogous to "good cop," who utilizes discretion in application of
rules to further object of rules). But the more those interpreting specific rules distort them, the more
the rules lose their function as guides for decisionmakers and for regulated parties. Cf. G. CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 41 (1982) (distorted interpretation of statutes by
courts raises danger that "[t]he language of a statute would no longer serve as a limit" on the way
courts apply it).
8. Administrative authority to employ this form of discretion is analogous to the royal dispensa-
tion power of early English law. This power allowed the king largely unbounded freedom to grant
individual subjects permission to disobey a law. See M. HALE, PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 176-78
(D. Yale ed. 1976); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 217-25 (2d ed. 1937).
9. Dispensatory discretion is largely the same as prosecutorial discretion. Both involve unilateral
decisions by governmental officials not to apply the literal terms of the law in an instance where the
rights of a private party are affected. Dispensatory discretion is broader, however, in that it encom-
passes procedural and substantive rules as well as decisions outside the enforcement process. Although
the details of dispensatory discretion often remain confidential, examples of this authority may be
found at most levels of agencies. High officials at the Environmental Protection Agency have em-
ployed such discretion both to initiate settlements of lawsuits and to order forbearance from adminis-
trative enforcement proceedings in situations where they deem further enforcement too expensive. See
Environmental Protection Agency Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1981). Similarly, FDA inspectors "focus their investiga-
tions on . . . criticial points [that the manufacturer has identified itself], as opposed to routinely
checking compliance with the FDA's almost endless list of 'good manufacturing practice' regulations."
E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 150. IRS inspectors exercise similar discretion in apply-
ing federal tax regulations. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 43-44 (1969). See generally
Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 629, 633-42 (1974)
(discussing ad hoc agency violations of procedural and substantive rules).
10. See infra p. 950.
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administered without clear standards or procedures, discretion under it
remains essentially dispensatory.
On the other hand, an agency may utilize an explicit regulatory process
that considers variances, waivers, or exceptions from rules."1 This mecha-
nism, which this Note will refer to as an exceptions process, seeks explicit
justification for treating special cases differently and attempts to classify
those cases systematically. The exceptions process usually incorporates an
opportunity for intervention or comment by interested parties, a written
explanation of decisions, an informal record of proceedings, and explicit
criteria to guide decisions. 2 Criteria for exceptions are usually broad
enough to allow administrators considerable, but not unlimited, flexibility
in treating special cases.1 When a large number of exceptions decisions
accumulate, adherence to precedent may further regularize an exceptions
process.
14
C. Failure To Come to Terms with Special Cases
Recent developments in administrative law have underscored the need
to treat the many special cases that arise under federal regulatory law.
Congress has passed increasingly detailed regulatory statutes that increase
11. Many statutes provide processes of this sort. See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Act of
1970, § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 665(d) (1976) (regulations codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1905.1-51 (1983)); Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) (1976) (regulations
codified at 40 Fed. Reg. 18,471-73 (1975)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 301(c), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(c) (1976) (regulations codified at 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1982)); Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§
416(b), 417, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1386(b), 1387 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (regulations codified at 14 C.F.R.
§§ 302.400-.410 (1983)).
12. These are the most typical features of an exceptions process; a given process may include more
or fewer procedural requirements. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1905.1-.51 (1983) (variance administered
by Occupational Safety and Health Administration; notice to affected parties, Federal Register notice,
opportunity for oral hearing, written statement of reasons for decision); 40 C.F.R. § 403.13 (1982)
(variance administered by EPA under Federal Water Pollution Control Act; notice and comment for
affected parties, written statement of reasons, decision criteria). The quasi-judicial requirements of
"formal adjudication" under 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (1982), however, generally do not apply to
exceptions processes. See Schuck, supra note 4, at appendices.
13. For example, criteria for adjustments under domestic crude oil price and allocation controls,
discussed infra pp. 951-54, required an applicant to show "special hardship, inequity or unfair distri-
bution of burdens." Department of Energy Organization Act § 504, 42 U.S.C. § 7194(a) (Supp. V
1981). The Civil Aeronautics Board long granted exemptions on the basis of the "public interest," 49
U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) (1976), which the courts defined as the interest in providing more air service to
the public. See Hughes Air Corp. v. CAB, 492 F.2d 567, 571-74 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The EPA grants
variances from National Pollution Discharge Eliminations Standards to plants whose output of pollu-
tants is determined by factors that are "fundamentally different from the factors considered by EPA in
development of the national limits." 40 C.F.R. § 125.30(a) (1982).
14. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DrI'T OF LABOR, STANDARDS FOR EXEMPTIONS FROM ERISA
PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS PROVISIONS (1980) (discussing exemptions precedents); Applications for
Exception Relating to Motor Gasoline Allocation Provisions, [9 DOE 1981-82] ENERGY MGMT.
(CCH) 80,054 (1979) (outlining system of exceptions precedents under motor gasoline allocation
regulations). At some point, of course, criteria and precedents may become specific and far-reaching
enough that they effectively establish a new rule, or an amendment to the old rule. See infra note 69
(discussing "Delta-Beacon" standards).
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the likelihood of conflicting legislative policies in isolated cases.15 A shift
by federal agencies from across-the-board adjudication to rulemaking
has lessened the opportunities for administrators to adjust policies to fit
individual circumstances. Congress and agencies, however, have often
failed to utilize an exceptions process or dispensatory discretion to address
special cases. In many cases this failure has led to strict application of
statutory and administrative rules without regard for their purpose or for
fair treatment of regulated parties.
17
Courts have also failed to appreciate fully the persistence of special
cases. Two contradictory lines of cases concerning the exceptions process
and dispensatory discretion have arisen. On the one hand, courts, in re-
manding administrative decisions on whether to apply rules in particular
cases, have increasingly instructed agencies to employ the structured pro-
cedures of the exceptions process."' On the other hand, the Supreme
Court, in reviewing general facial challenges to rules, has deferred to re-
15. E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 46-49; Aman, supra note 3, at 291.
16. For accounts of the shift to rulemaking, see Fuchs, Development and Diversification in Ad-
ministrative Rulemaking, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 83, 93-108 (1977); Gellhorn & Robinson, Rulenaking
'Due Process': An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 201, 202-03 (1981).
17. In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the Supreme Court found the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1536 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)), to be such a statute. The text of the Act required every agency "to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by it do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered
species and threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species
which is determined by the Secretary. . . to be critical." 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976). Under the Court's
interpretation, the Act prohibited any construction project that would endanger the habitat of even the
most insignificant rare species; thus, the potential destruction of the habitat of the snail darter was
sufficient to require the TVA to suspend construction of the huge Tellico Dam project. The Social
Security Administration promulgated regulations that established a "grid" of categories for consider-
ing disability appeals but failed to provide explicit leeway for special circumstances. See Note, Social
Security Determinations: The Use and Abuse of the Grid System, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 619 (1983).
But see Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983) (reversing remand that sought further specifica-
tion by agency of reasons the applicant was placed in "grid" category defined as "able to do light
work"). Enforcement officials of OSHA and the FDA have also evidenced reluctance to employ any
form of discretion to treat special cases. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 71-77 (FDA
and OSHA); S. KELMAN, REGULATING AMERIcA, REGULATING SWEDEN 195-220 (1981) (OSHA).
18. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 574 (1975) (remanding to Secretary of Labor
decision not to set aside union election for statement of "grounds of decision and the essential facts
upon which [his] inferences are based"); Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckleshaus, 439 F.2d 584
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (remanding registration of pesticide for reconsideration, with published standards
and written decisions, in public notice and comment proceeding); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d
1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (remanding agency's refusal to consider waiver from rule for reasoned decision
and suggesting on-record proceedings). This trend reverses the earlier tendency of courts to accept the
agency's exercise of discretion as procedurally adequate. See, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1969) (deferring to agency's refusal to review termination of research grant by Veterans'
Administration); United States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1969) (deferring to agency's refusal
to review denial of mining claim by Secretary of the Interior under Mining Claims Occupancy Act).
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fusals by the Environmental Protection Agency1" and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission 20 to establish exceptions processes.21
The current judicial indifference toward the exceptions process in re-
view of rulemaking is ultimately irreconcilable with the judicial prefer-
ence for more structured procedures in challenges to specific acts of dis-
pensatory discretion. If special cases are a persistent problem, and if
courts find an exceptions process superior to dispensatory discretion as a
way to address such cases, then courts should favor exceptions processes in
challenges to rulemakings as well as in actions contesting exercises of dis-
pensatory discretion. To resolve this contradiction properly, a careful con-
sideration of both the need for discretion in special cases and the relative
merits of the exceptions process and dispensatory discretion is essential.
II. REGULATORY VALUES, DISPENSATORY DISCRETION, AND THE
EXCEPTIONS PROCESS
Any analysis of the need to address special cases must start from a set
of principles, or "regulatory values," that inform current administrative
19. In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), the Court addressed a
challenge to two sets of Environmental Protection Agency regulations under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896 (1972) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). One set of rules established "effluent limitation
standards" for all existing industrial sources of pollution to be met by 1977; the other set out "na-
tional standards of performance" for new sources of industrial pollution. The statutory language pre-
scribing each set of regulations was similarly strict. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e) (1976) ("[Ilt shall
be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any
standard of performance applicable to such source.") with 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (1976) ("Effluent
limitations established pursuant to this section of section 1312 of this title shall be applied to all point
sources of discharge of pollutants in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."). The conference
version of the Water Pollution Control Act excluded "variances" for special cases under the respective
provisions from the original House and Senate versions. JoINT CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 22-23, 30-32, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3776, 3797-98, 3804-06. The
EPA had issued regulations that established a variance procedure under the 1977 standards, but es-
tablished no such process under the new source standards. Train, 430 U.S. at 122-23. The Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed this approach, essentially deferring to the agency's judgment. Under the
1977 standards, the Court asserted, the variance procedure was not only permissible but required. Id.
at 128. The Court simultaneously maintained, however, that "[i]t was dear that Congress intended
[the new source] standards to be absolute prohibitions." Id. at 138.
20. In United States v. Florida E.C. Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), the Court upheld a broad rule
established through informal rulemaking by the Interstate Commerce Commission over the objections
of several railroads that they were entitled to different treatment. Although an exceptions process was
missing from the regulations, the Court ignored the problem of special cases. This effectively delegated
to the agency the authority to address such cases or disregard them as administrators saw fit.
21. These cases undercut previous ones in which an exceptions process for a rule helped to con-
vince the Supreme Court that the rulemaking procedure which devised the rule had assured due
process to the regulated parties. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742,
755 (1972) (upholding rulemaking in presence of exceptions process and noting authority of agency to
establish exceptions process); FPC v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964) (upholding FPC rule where
exceptions process exists; failure of party challenging the regulations to apply to exceptions process
weakens challenge to regulations); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956)
(upholding rulemaking by FCC against demands for across-the-board individual hearings; existence of
the exceptions process assured that regulations met "necessity for flexibility in the Rules").
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procedural regulations, legislative enactments, and constitutional doc-
trines.12 These values generally support both the exercise of some form of
administrative discretion to address special cases and a preference for the
exceptions process over dispensatory discretion.
A. Equal Treatment
The first regulatory value embodies the basic precept that persons situ-
ated similarly should be treated similarly.2" On its face, this principle of
equal treatment implies a preference for consistent application of rules
over the haphazardness of ad hoc decisionmaking.24 Agency administrators
have expressed such a preference in the shift from case-by-case adjudica-
tion to greater use of rulemaking.25
Closer inspection of this principle, however, reveals a corollary: Differ-
ent cases should be treated differently.2" Different cases arise when the
literal terms of a rule clash with the underlying purposes of a rule or the
purposes of other rules.27 At some point underlying or interdependent reg-
22. Other authors have attempted to set out values as a tool for evaluating the administration of
agency rules. See, e.g., Cramton, A Comment on Trial-T)pe Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting,
58 VA. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1972) (using "accuracy," "efficiency," and "acceptability"); Verkuil,
The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279 (1978) ("adminis-
trative procedure should be concerned with the overall fairness and accuracy of decisions, with their
efficient and low-cost resolution, and, in a democratic society, with participant satisfaction with the
process").
23. H.L.A. Hart argues that, in its simplest form, justice in the application of law "consists in no
more than taking seriously the notion that what is to be applied to a multiplicity of different persons
is the same general rule, undeflected by prejudice, interest, or caprice." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 202 (1961). The Kantian, utilitarian, and entitlements-based theories of social justice all
regard some form of equal treatment as an important value. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Pro-
cess: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv. 885, 906-22 (1981).
24. See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 19 (1962) ("basic human
claim that the law should provide like treatment under like circumstances" is reason for "better defi-
nition of standards in administrative adjudication"); cf. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Pol-
icy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 516-17 (1970) (explaining FTC justification for use of rulemaking; "in general,
rulemaking is likely to be more . . . uniform than adjudication").
25. See supra note 16.
26. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 315-17 (H. Rackman trans. 1926) ("[Wlhen...
the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is
then right ... to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were
present on the occasion."); H.L.A. HART, supra note 23, at 155 (recounting need to "treat different
cases differently"). The "irrebuttable presumption" cases of the 1970's demonstrate the emphasis the
Supreme Court has placed on this principle of differential treatment. In these cases, the Supreme
Court relied on the due process clause to invalidate overbroad statutory or administrative classifica-
tions ("irrebuttable presumptions") that did not permit individuals to contest their inclusion under a
rule in light of its apparent purpose. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (presumption that
person who had been involved in accident and had no liability insurance was at fault and therefore
must lose driver's license); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (pre-
sumption that household with child over 18, who had been claimed as "dependent" for federal income
tax purposes by taxpayers themselves ineligible for food stamp relief, was not needy and was therefore
ineligible for food stamps).
27. See Note, supra note 9, at 643 ("[A] number of agencies which have waived requirements that
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ulatory purposes become so important and so contingent on differential
treatment under the rule that they are impossible to disregard.2" Instances
that require differential treatment may be so substantial or numerous that
a general rule must be amended to accommodate them.29 They may, how-
ever, be so isolated and exceptional that treating them differently requires
not a change in the general rule but only discretionary modification or
annulment in a few special circumstances.30
The value of equal treatment supports a preference for the exceptions
process as a mechanism to exercise discretion in special cases in two ways.
First, the exceptions process helps an agency identify special cases and
treat them differently from others. The requirement of a written, reasoned
decision assures that an agency will weigh more thoughtfully whether a
rule should be applied to a particular case."' In the exercise of dispensa-
tory discretion without such a requirement, an administrator may well
reach a less careful decision. The visibility fostered by the dissemination of
written decisions, as well as the requirement of an informal record, miti-
gates the tendency toward favoritism that is endemic to dispensatory treat-
ment of special cases.32
an applicant for a benefit submit certain information have based the waiver on the ground that the
favored applicant met the substantive prerequisites for the benefit.") (citations omitted). While Con-
gress generally spares agencies responsibility for weighing an array of purposes by specifying regula-
tory objectives itself in authorizing statutes, these purposes are usually broad and vague. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 753(b) (1982) (purposes of Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act range from "protection of
public health . . . safety and welfare" to "equitable distribution" and "economic efficiency"); 29
U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976) (general purpose of OSHA Act is "to provide for the general welfare, to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions and to preserve our human resources"). Similarly, purposes outside the regulatory frame-
work may also be important. See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962) (ICC
must consider requirements of National Labor Relations Act in evaluating request for motor common
carrier certificate).
28. Since no two cases are identical, a principle of differential treatment, applied to the fullest
possible extent, might call for individualized adjudication across the board to take into account even
the slightest differences between situations. Such an absolute application of the principle of differential
treatment would, however, fail to acknowledge values such as efficiency and predictability, which are
inherent in more general rules. See infra pp. 949-50.
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (rulemaking process nec-
essary to formulate "rules of general application"); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1010
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982) (where recognition in adjudication of different
circumstances than those provided for by rule "changes existing law, and has widespread application,
... the matter should be addressed by rulemaking.").
30. See Note, supra note 9, at 642-43. In practice, demands for a new rule and for discretion in
special cases may be difficult to distinguish, since an individual departure from a rule may set a broad
precedent or even exert significant influence on policy on its own. See Schuck, supra note 4, at
194-99; Comment, supra note 4, at 1138.
31. See Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Or-
ders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 224 ("[R]eversals for inadequate. . . subsidiary findings will require the
agency to rethink the problem and, if it adheres to the previous decision, to state its position in a
manner that may provoke a ruling on an issue of law."); Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 73 (1975) ("single, comprehensive, detailed justification" for agency
decision "would force the agency to choose between alternative data, theories and methodologies").
32. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARM. L. REv. 1669,
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Second, an exceptions process promotes similar treatment of special
cases. Equal treatment requires that similar special cases be treated simi-
larly, and written decisions in the exceptions process encourage preceden-
tial treatment of such cases. If an agency fails to follow this principle of
equal treatment in an exceptions process, courts reviewing the agency's
decisions will generally require that they be consistent or that substantial
inconsistencies be explained. 33 Similarly, written criteria in many excep-
tions processes, however broad, provide guidance to decisionmakers that a
purely dispensatory procedure lacks.
B. Accountability
The essence of accountability is that administrators who apply rules
should be responsible to some ultimate political authority.3 In the admin-
istrative process, this value implies that the bureaucracy be responsive to
elected officials,3 5 especially to the legislators who established the agency's
mission.3 6
1756 (1975) (explaining "requirement of adequate consideration" of different views that underlies
requirement of informal record).
33. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8:9, at 198 (2d ed. 1979) ("dominant"
law in agencies and courts "is that an agency must either follow its own precedents or explain why it
departs from them"). But see Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Agency Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 947-52 (1965) (precedents less binding than flat, pre-
ordained rules).
34. Many scholars have emphasized the tendency of regulatory bureaucracy to disregard its mis-
sion in favor of maintaining the status quo. See, e.g., A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 195 (1967)
("[B]ureaus have a powerful tendency to continue doing today whatever they did yesterday. .. .");
Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 470 (1952) (describing failure of ICC to
adapt to "felt needs" in regulated environment), or promoting the interest of regulated industry, see R.
FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC 311
(1970) (accusing ICC of failure to support public interest against that of regulated companies).
35. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance to the Constitutional framework of con-
gressional oversight activities such as investigations. See McGrain v. Daughtery, 273 U.S. 135, 174
(1927) ("power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function"). On the value of oversight more generally, the classic reference is W. WIL-
SON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 281 (1896) ("Congress is, and must be,. . . the nation's voice"
in securing faithful implementation of laws by the Executive). Recent commentators have often looked
beyond Congress itself to the President to foster bureaucratic responsiveness. See, e.g., Bruff, Presi-
dential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 453-63 (1979) (advocating presi-
dential intervention in rulemaking); Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395, 1414 (1975) (recommending that President be authorized "to modify or direct cer-
tain agency action").
36. Congressional oversight is particularly important in guiding agency behavior when legislative
delegations are broad, vague, or contradictory. Congressional appropriations, committee hearings, staff
investigations and ombudsman work comprise the usual oversight activities by the legislative branch.
For fuller accounts of these activities, see W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 103-16 (7th ed. 1979); 1976 Bicentennial Inst., Oversight and Review
of Agency Decisionmaking, 28 AD. L. REV. 569 (1976). Recent attempts to reform the administrative
process also manifest a deep-seated concern for the accountability of administrative agencies. These
efforts include "sunset" legislation to curtail agency authorization after a certain period, more inten-
sive judicial review, a mandatory legislated budget for regulatory agencies, and a legislated calendar of
major regulatory actions. For descriptions of these reforms, see R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, RE-
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Concern for accountability provides an additional justification for treat-
ing special cases differently. Conflicting policies and purposes of Congress
may be manifest in the enabling statute of an agency as well as in the
relation of that statute to other laws. 7 Even if Congress fails to authorize
an exceptions process explicitly, an accountable agency must make sense
of these conflicts and contradictions in part by exercising discretion in
cases where such policies and purposes override the literal terms of a
rule.38
To heighten accountability, agencies should exercise discretion in spe-
cial cases in a way that promotes effective oversight. The informal record,
written criteria, and written decisions of an exceptions process allow
members of Congregs and their staffs to assess the exercise of discretion in
special cases.39 Dispensatory discretion, even if publicized, may offer no
evidence of how decisions were made. Written records and criteria in ex-
ceptions proceedings also allow the press, the public, the regulated parties,
and the courts to reinforce direct congressional oversight by monitoring
the exercise of discretion.40
C. Participation
Liberal democratic theory has long relied on popular participation in
governmental decisionmaking as a central ideal.' Those who participate
in decisionmaking can better ensure that governmental actions further
their interests.4'2 The "model of interest representation" associated with
this principle prescribes that administrative policymakers and courts
should seek to expand participation and to redress representational imbal-
ances between well-organized and unorganized interests.43 In regulatory
FORMING FEDERAL REGULATION (1983); McGowan, Congress, Courts, and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1130-74 (1977).
37. See supra note 27.
38. Strictly applying a rule to a situation in which a more important legislative purpose prescribes
exemption can infringe on accountability as seriously as disregarding all rules. See R. KAGAN, supra
note 4, at 99-125 (describing accountability to regulatory purposes under wage-price freeze of 1970);
P. NONET & P. SELZNIcK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 39-42
(1978) (criticizing rigid, narrow "official perspective" in interpretation of rules).
39. See infra notes 71-72.
40. See Schuck, supra note 4, at Gil (discussing importance of trade publications and associations
in monitoring exceptions processes in wide range of agencies).
41. See J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 69-80 (1862); J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 228-34 (1971).
42. See J.S. MILL, supra note 41, at 65 ("[T]he rights and interests of every or any person are
only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed
to stand up for them."). But see R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 82 (1983) ("To
the extent that access to organizations, and consequently [participation through them], is not equally
distributed among citizens, then the criteria of the democratic process are not satisfied.").
43. See Stewart, supra note 32, at 1722, 1760-61, 1805. The origins of this model can be traced
in part to pluralist political theory, which stresses the dynamics of interest-group interaction as a way
to further the overall interests of society. See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
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proceedings, such elements as notice and comment for affected parties,
published criteria for decisionmaking, and written decisions increase the
level and effectiveness of participation.
44
Any mechanism that allows parties to request regulatory relief may
help officials determine where special cases exist and how to address
them. But the more formalized exceptions process both promotes a higher
level of participation and enables more effective participation than does
dispensatory discretion. While an agency may ignore or discourage re-
quests for dispensatory discretion as a matter of whim, favoritism, or
unarticulated policy, an exceptions process ensures an ongoing opportu-
nity to present arguments for special treatment that the agency must ad-
dress.45 Representation of other parties besides the one requesting discre-
tion may also further the value of participation by aiding the efforts of
decisionmakers to discern special cases and treat such cases appropri-
ately.46 While dispensatory discretion may or may not encourage partici-
pation by third parties, the requirement of notice and comment in an ex-
ceptions process consistently does.47
200-22 (2d ed. 1935) (describing nature of interest groups and role in political process); D. TRUMAN,
THE GOVERNMENT PROCEss 437-78 (2d ed. 1971) (describing interaction among various interests as
fundamental determinant of how government works).
44. The APA requirements, such as notice and comment and a trial-type hearing, increase oppor-
tunities for participation. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554, 556-557 (1982). Recently courts have also cited the
due process clause as a basis for mandating procedural elements that broaden participation where the
APA does not. See Historic Green Springs v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 851-56 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(requiring publication of substantive standards and procedural rules for designation of national his-
toric landmarks). Recent reforms liberalizing rules concerning standing to challenge agency decisions,
private rights of action, rights of intervention in administrative proceedings, and rights to initiate
prosecutions further reflect the importance of this value. For a general discussion of these require-
ments, see Mashaw, Rights in the Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. (1983) (forthcoming); Stewart,
supra note 32, at 1723-60.
45. While the exceptions process cannot guarantee that an agency will give full consideration to
requests for special treatment, its requirements at least encourage decisionmakers to consider requests
seriously. See supra note 31.
46. An adversary proceeding in the exceptions process generates a clash between different view-
points through minimal notice and comment procedures, rather than through a full trial-type hearing.
See Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 753-56 (1976).
47. Moreover, informal negotiation between the agency and interested parties-a recent focus of
proponents of greater participation-may further participation by encouraging greater interaction and
cooperation among regulated parties. On the value of negotiation in general, see Fuller, Media-
tion-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971); Schuck, Litigation, Bargaining, and
Regulation, REGULATION, Jul.-Aug. 1979, at 26. The unstructured nature of dispensatory discretion
might appear to capitalize best on this mode of representation. But "informal conferences," which
amount to negotiating sessions, are available in exceptions processes administered by the Department
of Labor, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,471, 18,472-73 (1975), and by the Department of Energy, 10 C.F.R. §
205.55(a)(1) (1983). Similarly, OSHA allows regulated parties to initiate "informal settlement confer-
ences" with area directors before the agency files suit. Informal Settlement and Conference with Area
Director, [1981] O.S.H.A. COMPLIANCE GUIDE (CCH) 4041. Negotiated settlements with individ-
ual violators, to the extent that the safeguards of the exceptions process are present, may be equivalent
to the granting of exceptions.
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D. Predictability
Predictability enables regulated parties to adjust their behavior to ac-
cord with legal requirements. This value, which originates both from no-
tions of fairness and the desire to promote regulatory objectives, is fur-
thered through clarity and publicity of rules, and through the constancy of
rules over time.48 In current administrative law, requirements such as no-
tice to the public and to specific parties, publication of criteria for deci-
sions, and written records and explanations promote these ends.49
At first blush, the most predictable rule would seem to be one applied
strictly according to its own specific terms. But limited exercise of discre-
tion in special cases, by adhering to the more general expectations inferred
from the purposes of the rule or other rules, actually ensures that strict
application of a rule will not upset the expectations of regulated parties.50
An explicit exceptions process, moreover, can clarify an agency's intention
to address special cases without any effect on the vast majority of more
typical cases.5 In fact, since an explicit mechanism spares rulemakers
from addressing special cases in the rules themselves, it may permit rules
that are clearer and easier to follow.5"
If an agency explicitly authorizes discretion in special cases but exer-
cises that discretion in an otherwise dispensatory fashion, the difficulty of
predicting what will be a special case persists. The safeguards that char-
acterize an exceptions process mitigate this difficulty by better informing
potential applicants to the exceptions process that they are eligible for re-
lief. In addition, since courts are more likely to defer to reasoned, written
decisions than to less formalized decisions,5" an exceptions process helps to
48. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 51-65, 79-81 (1964) (describing clarity, pros-
pecti,'eness, and constancy through time as ideals central to concept of law); J. RAWLS, supra note 41,
at 238 ("[T]he precept that there is no offense without a law ... demands that laws be known and
expressly promulgated, that their meaning be clearly defined, that statutes be general both in state-
ment and intent . . ").
49. On the role of constancy, clarity, and publicity in administrative law, see generally S. BREYER
& R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 311-462 (1979); E. GELLHORN,
C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 97-99, 393-419.
50. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962) (ICC must consider
National Labor Relations Act in taking action under own enabling statute); United States v. Chevron
Oil Co., 583 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978) (overturning application of regulatory "sheen test" to meet
statutory standard for harmful oil spills, where defendant showed that spill which produced sheen on
water caused no harm).
51. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 33, at § 8.7, at 185 (statutory "escape clause" attached to general
rule is "one of the best ways of controlling discretion").
52. See Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 66,
77 (1974) (general rules cannot take into account all the complexities of individual instances unless
attached to a "safety valve" like the exceptions process); see also infra note 78 (describing application
of rule with exceptions clause).
53. Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983) (remanding repeal of passive restraint requirement to National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration for explanation of departure from articulated policy) with Sherrill v.
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shield parties from the consequences of unpredictable shifts in policy
preference.
E. Efficiency
The final regulatory value, efficiency, originates in the limits on re-
sources available to an agency and to private parties. For the purposes of
this argument, an efficient agency should seek to minimize the total ex-
penses of administrative procedures and litigation as well as the costs of
delay in such proceedings." The administrative cost of adjusting policies
separately in every individual case is a principal basis for the recent shift
by agencies from across-the-board adjudication to rulemaking,55 and for
the continued reliance by agencies on forms of adjudication that lack the
costly procedural elements of formal APA adjudication. 6
Exercise of discretion in special cases furthers efficiency by lowering the
cost of administrative and judicial proceedings to devise and enforce a
rule. Allowing some form of discretion in special cases saves the cost of
attempting to foresee every conceivable contingency and of providing for
them specifically in the rule." An agency that fails to exercise discretion
in special cases invites litigation by parties that have reason to believe
exceptional circumstances supply a basis for overturning application of the
rule to them.5" In the same way, failure to exercise discretion also induces
parties in special circumstances to contest application of rules in the ad-
ministrative stages of enforcement.
By institutionalizing the exercise of discretion in special cases through
an exceptions process, an agency will necessarily add to the administrative
costs of treating such cases.59 An agency can nonetheless design an excep-
Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (refusing to require statement of reasons for denial of White
House press pass where denial stemmed from largely unarticulated prior policy).
54. Other writers have interpreted this value as an overarching calculation of all relevant benefits
and costs. See Diver, supra note 6, at 72-74; Erlich & Posner, supra note 7, at 257-58.
55. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 24, at 516-17 (explaining FTC justification for use of
rulemaking: "[I]n general, rulemaking is likely to be more efficient ... than adjudication . . .");
Verkuil, supra note 22, at 297 ("[T]he trend towards rulemaking reduces the time and expense of the
ratemaking process .... ).
56. Perhaps 90% of governmental actions that directly affect individuals take the form of informal
adjudication beyond the reach of the APA. See 2 K. DAvis, supra note 33, at 158; Gardner, The
Procedures by Which Informal Action is Taken, 24 AD. L. REv. 155, 156 (1972).
57. See Diver, supra note 6, at 73 (cost of high level of specification in rulemaking tends to favor
open-ended rules); Erlich & Posner, supra note 7, at 268 (cheaper to allow "ad hoc exceptions" in
enforcement than to specify all possible exceptions in rule).
58. See cases cited supra note 50.
59. Preparing an exceptions application, particularly when the claim of special circumstances re-
quires collection of highly technical data, may be more expensive and time-consuming than unstruc-
tured discretion. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 76. The records in an exceptions
process may render exceptions decisions more subject to costly judicial review. See supra note 53.
Furthermore, the cost of an exceptions process, unlike dispensatory discretion, includes expenses for
submission and processing of many unsuccessful applications, since even relatively lenient exceptions
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tions process to impose a relatively small burden on the agency and regu-
lated parties. The notice and comment, written decisions, and informal
record of an exceptions process constitute perhaps the most efficient set of
procedural safeguards acceptable in light of other regulatory values,60 and
additional requirements may further reduce administrative expense and
delay."1 Moreover, the exceptions process can ultimately lower overall
costs of litigation. By indicating the agency's intent to exempt special cir-
cumstances through a regularized procedure, such a process encourages a
court reviewing a rule to give less credence to any "parade of horribles"
offered by challengers to the rule, 2 and thus discourages facial
challenges.6"
Ill. REGULATORY VALUES, SPECIAL CASES, AND OIL CONTROLS
The implications of these regulatory values for the treatment of special
cases emerge more clearly in the context of a particular regulatory pro-
gram. From 1973 to 1981, controls on the price and allocation of domestic
crude oil and oil products imposed a vast network of intricately detailed
processes may deny far more applications than they grant. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines v. United States,
490 F. Supp. 907, 912-13 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (35% rate of approval for medical exemptions for pilots
taken as sign of excessive relief); Department of Energy Gasoline Allocation Program: Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 166, 184 (1980) (27.5% rate of approval of exceptions for motor gasoline retail-
ers from price and allocation regulations during 1979 gasoline shortage) [hereinafter cited as Gasoline
Hearings] .
60. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 235-39 (Supp. 1982); Verkuil, supra note
46, at 748-49, 780-81.
61. A mandatory threshold evidentiary showing subject to summary denial of exceptions relief,
see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1905.40-.41 (1981) (administered by OSHA); 40 C.F.R. § 164.91 (1983) (ad-
ministered by EPA), may reduce the cost of processing for the agency and discourage frivolous claims.
See 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.7 (2d ed. 1980); Gellhorn & Robinson,
SummaryJudgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV. L. REV. 612 (1971). A strict burden
of proof, as applied under the 1970 price freeze, see A. WEBER, supra note 5, at 82, or in the
"fundamentally different factors" variance under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Interview
with Bruce Diamond, attorney, EPA Office of General Counsel, in Washington, D.C. (June 14,
1982), may reinforce this effect. Informal conferences can further expedite proceedings. See 3 K. DA-
vis, supra, at § 14.8; 4 STAFF ON SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, 41-53 (Comm. Print 1977).
62. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 601 n.44 (1981) (courts "consider the
validity of challenged rules in light of the flexibility provided by the [exceptions process]") (citing
United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192 (1956)).
63. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which an exceptions process would entail excessively
high costs, and thus be undesirable despite the other values it promoted. For example, an exceptions
process may generate such costly applications that processing expenses are prohibitive. Special circum-
stances may be extremely difficult to identify and may require collecting expensive scientific or techni-
cal data, see E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, supra note 3, at 76, or regulated parties may find it too easy
to subvert any requirements of a threshold showing by distorting initial submissions. A rule may fit so
exactly that it generates virtually no special cases, making an exceptions process inefficient. In any of
these instances, dispensatory discretion might be preferred. Barring such circumstances, however, a
properly managed exceptions process will not significantly undermine the value of efficiency.
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regulation on one of the most complicated industries in the world. 4
Throughout the duration of controls, an exceptions office 5 considered ap-
plications for regulatory relief in typical exceptions proceedings.66
Thousands of regulated parties applied for exceptions. Pleas for relief
rested implicitly on a principle of equal treatment, in light of overriding
regulatory or statutory purposes.67 An exception might entitle the appli-
cant to full or partial adjustment of obligations under the regulations.6"
Dispensatory discretion, of course, could have done the same, but the
written decisions of the exceptions process enabled both reasoned treat-
ment of individual cases and the development of lines of precedent to en-
sure more consistent treatment of similar special cases.69 Equal treatment
thus was furthered in a two-fold manner: Special cases received special
64. Controls were imposed under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-159, 87 Stat. 628 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760(h) (1982)). For general treatments of the
system of controls, see PETROLEUM REGULATION HANDBOOK (J. Bell ed. 1980); ENERGY POuCY IN
PERSPECrIVE 395-663 (C. Goodwin ed. 1981).
65. This office, established in 1974, was known as the Office of Exceptions and Appeals until
1977 and is currently called the Office of Hearings and Appeals.
66. Congress authorized the exceptions process by providing for "the making of such adjustments,
consistent with the other purposes of this chapter, as may be necessary to prevent special hardship,
inequity, or unfair distribution of burdens. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 766(b) (1982). The statute mandates
that procedures for the process be established by regulation, that written exceptions decisions be avail-
able to the public, and that further written criteria and guidelines for the process be established. Id.
Procedural regulations for exceptions include provisions for notice and comment by interested parties,
10 C.F.R. § 205.53 (1983), for discovery, 10 C.F.R. § 205.66 (1983), for informal conferences, 10
C.F.R. § 205.67 (1983), for evidentiary hearings, 10 C.F.R. § 205.68 (1983), and for temporary
exceptions, 10 C.F.R. § 205.128 (1983).
67. One applicant, for example, was a small refiner created by an antitrust consent decree in
1972. The decree had ordered the refiner to embark on a rapid capital expansion program. In 1974, a
regulatory system of transfer payments among all refiners suddenly confronted the company with a
burden that endangered not only the capital expansion program but the company's very existence. See
Pasco, Inc. [2 FEA 1975] ENERGY MGMT. (CCH) 83,021, at 83,052-55 (Jan. 20, 1975).
68. Pasco, for example, was relieved of 52% of its monetary obligation under the refiner transfer-
payment program. In granting relief, the exceptions office looked beyond the specific regulations to
the purposes embodied in the authorizing statute and in the antitrust laws. [2 FEA 1975] ENERGY
MGMr. (CCH) at 83,056-57. The agency based its differential handling of this special case on the
value of equal treatment with respect to these more important objectives. Id.
69. The degree of consistency provided by reliance on precedent varied greatly. Some cases estab-
lished broad principles that the exceptions office could apply in a largely discretionary manner. One
such principle, listed in the Exceptions Guidelines under the criterion of "serious hardship," was that
exception relief would be granted to a firm "experiencing severe and inordinate financial difficulties
as a result of the FEA regulatory program." Exceptions and Appeals Guidelines, [9 DOE 1981-1982]
ENERGY MGrr. (CCH) 80,006, at 80,009. Precedents for this principle included Kerr-McGee
Corp., [3 FEA 1975-1976] ENERGY MGMT (CCH) 83,179, at 83,706 (May 7, 1976), and Union
Oil of California, id. 83,105, at 83,382 (Feb. 20, 1976). On the other hand, the "Delta-Beacon"
standards for exception relief to small refiners established on the basis of the Pasco case and similar
cases eventually relied on a strict accounting formula that amounted to a rule in itself. See Beacon Oil
Co., id. 1 83,209 (June 8, 1976); Delta Refining Co., [2 FEA 1975] ENERGY MGMT. (CCH)
83,275 (Sept. 11, 1975). Other standards between these extremes established criteria but left consider-
able flexibility, as in the standard for assignment of a new supplier to an independent marketer of oil
products, Exceptions and Appeal Guidelines [9 DOE 1981-82] ENERGY MGMr. (CCH) 80,012, at
80,011. For further discussion of the role of precedents in this exceptions process, see UNrrED STATEs
TASK FORCE ON REFORM OF FED. ENERGY ADMIN., FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULA-
TION 110-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; Schuck, supra note 4, at 154-55.
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treatment, and similar special cases received similar treatment with re-
spect to each other.
This exceptions process also fostered greater administrative accountabil-
ity to Congress.70 The written decisions and informal records of excep-
tions proceedings aided congressional review of the process in committee
hearings.7 1 The institutional identity that followed from an established ex-
ceptions process invited frequent calls from individual Congressmen and
their staff,72 as well as persistent scrutiny by trade publications.
7 1
The volume of exceptions cases indicated the level of participation the
process encouraged, 4 and the structured elements of the process made
such participation more likely to aid proper treatment of special cases.
75
In several instances, participation in individual exceptions proceedings
helped to pinpoint more general problems in the regulations that were
ultimately addressed by an amendment to a rule.
76
The contribution of the exceptions process to the values associated with
predictability in this instance is less clear. The statutory criteria were
broad and vague, and the clarity and specificity of the guidelines describ-
70. In Pasco, for example, the agency had to acknowledge that its own regulatory purpose of fair
treatment for small refiners, as well as the legislative purpose embodied in the antitrust laws, overrode
the objectives of the specific progam at issue. [2 FEA 1975] ENERGY MG.r. (CCH) 83,021, at
83,056-57 (Jan. 20, 1975). Such statements help to assure that Congress itself, or courts reviewing
decisions in light of statutory language, will be able to instruct agencies on the proper weights to be
given various purposes where Congress disagrees with the agencies' weighting.
71. For examples of hearings utilizing written exceptions material, see Gasoline Hearings, supra
note 59, at 168-93; Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1981: Hearings on H.R. 7724 Before the Subcomm. on Dep't of Interior and Related Agencies of the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1098-1105, 1128-32 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as FY 1981 Appropriations Hearings]; Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (Federal
Energy Administration): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 16, 50-54 (1975).
72. Schuck, supra note 4, at 180-81. The exceptions office took care, however, to avoid allowing
congressional pressure to influence specific substantive outcomes. See id., at 153.
73. For example, Energy Litigation Report, published weekly by McGraw-Hill Co. throughout
the period of controls, devoted itself in large part to coverage of the growing case law of exceptions.
The Energy Management series, published by Commerce Clearing House, compiled exceptions deci-
sions on a current basis.
74. The greatest number of exceptions requests occurred between March 1 and July 1 of 1979,
when the office received 30,000 requests, nearly 10 times the average level during the previous years
of controls. See Gasoline Hearings, supra note 59, at 164.
75. Participation often took the form of oral presentations as well as written submissions; in either
instance, an adversary relationship might develop between competitors or companies contending for a
limited amount of total benefits in an allocation program. See Schuck, supra note 4, at 160-64. Under
the regulations, additional written submissions were the preferred method. Next, in order of prefer-
ence, came interrogatories, depositions, and evidentiary hearings. 10 C.F.R. § 205.63 (1982). Adver-
sary proceedings, defined broadly, could take place through any of these devices.
76. During the 1979 gasoline shortage, for example, information collected in exceptions proceed-
ings was the basis for clarifications of certain rules as well as for a new rule allowing automatic
adjustments in the regulations for stations whose growth since the end of the allocation base period
had produced a demand that exceeded these stations' allocated supply. See Schuck, supra note 4, at
128-39.
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ing lines of precedents varied greatly.7 7 In a few instances, however, as in
the regulations that governed the allocation of motor gasoline between
1974 and 1979, reliance on the exceptions process enabled the agency to
make simpler rules.
78
Efficiency was also only partly served. The procedural regulations al-
lowed for more costly trial-type proceedings but were biased toward more
informal ones." The vast majority of exceptions cases lasted less than two
months and did not include a hearing; these cases consequently generated
insubstantial administrative costs.80 A handful of cases entailed formal
trial-type procedures, round after round of complex discovery requests,
years of deliberation,81 and ultimately an exceedingly high price for indi-
vidualized consideration.
On balance, however, despite the flaws in this exceptions process,82 it
ultimately made an important contribution to the regulatory values of
equal treatment, accountability, participation, predictability, and
efficiency. 83
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE EXCEPTIONS PROCESS
A. The Role of the Agencies and Congress
To give the regulatory values discussed above their fullest effect, agen-
cies should exercise discretion in special cases and do so through an excep-
tions process. In certain instances, however, other considerations might
properly lead Congress and agencies either not to allow the exercise of
discretion at all, or to allow discretion only through the mechanism of
dispensatory discretion.
77. See supra note 69.
78. After the 1973-74 gasoline shorage eased, a new rule provided simply that "adjustments will
be granted only for the purpose of preventing or correcting a serious hardship or gross inequity," and
only through the exceptions process. 39 Fed. Reg. 36,854, 36,855 (Oct. 15, 1974). The weakness of
the DOE's rulemaking process, perhaps exacerbated by excessive reliance on the exceptions process,
prevented administrators from exploiting this aspect of the exceptions process systematically to their
advantage. See Schuck, supra note 4, at 188-91; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GASOLINE ALLO-
CATION: A CHAOTIC PROGRAM IN NEED OF OVERHAUL, Report No. EMD-80-34 (Apr. 23, 1980).
79. See supra note 75.
80. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 108-10. Schuck, supra note 4, at 178. A flood of
applications resulting from the 1979 gasoline shortage pushed the average processing time back to
four months, but in many cases grants of interim relief mitigated any problems resulting from delay.
See FY 1981 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 71, at 1130.
81. Such proceedings tended consider exceptions with clear significance for general agency policy,
such as those which might grant expensive remedies to one company to the detriment of others. An
exceptions proceeding concerning relief to Ashland Oil Company, for example, lasted more than two-
and-a-half years and entailed several trial-type hearings and discovery requests. See Schuck, supra
note 4, at 109-15.
82. Most notably, the process came under criticism for improper coordination with rulemaking.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 123-36; Schuck, supra note 4, at 181-86.
83. For similar general assessments, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 69, at 109-10; Schuck,
supra note 4, at 180.
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Congress and agencies might choose not to allow any exercise of discre-
tion where the nature of the rule or the regulated activity is such that
providing for a waiver of the rule would seriously undermine the basic
purpose of the regulation. This may occur when Congress and agencies
cannot devise standards to define a class of special cases.8 4 Where, how-
ever, such standards can be devised to define a class of special cases, the
purpose of a rule may simply be so important as to require a policy of
uniform application. 5 Having decided that discretion should be exercised,
agencies and Congress should choose an exceptions process over exclusive
dispensatory discretion unless the process would entail efficiency costs that
clearly outweigh its contribution to the other values.86
B. The Role of Courts
Courts, too, must give effect to these regulatory values. A judicial doc-
trine regarding exceptions should induce agencies to address the problems
posed by special cases and, where appropriate, should impose exceptions
processes on agencies. Such an exceptions doctrine, however, must take
account not only of the regulatory values but also of the principle of judi-
84. The Federal Aviation Administration, for example, has refused to grant exceptions to its age-
60 limit for pilots on such grounds. See Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding
FAA's practice). According to the agency, no reliable criteria can separate those eligible for such
exceptions from those ineligible. Id. at 309. Consequently, an exceptions process would probably lead
to the licensing of unfit pilots and would thereby undermine the agency's mandate to promote air
safety.
85. See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (legislative purpose
supports EPA decision not to grant "best practicable technology" variances under Federal Water
Pollution Control Act on basis of economic hardship); Industrial Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 437 F.2d
680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (to grant waiver under FCC rule governing nighttime radio frequencies
would undermine rulemaking). Overriding statutory purposes of this sort are most likely to be found
in regulatory schemes that further important national objectives such as health and safety or civil
rights. See Diver, Policy)naking Paradigms, supra note 3, at 431-32.
86. An exceptions process might, for example, be an inefficient replacement for the dispensatory
discretion exercised, in multitudinous instances and often for minor violations, by the auditors who
apply the Internal Revenue Code and regulations under it. See K. DAvis, supra note 9, at 43-44.
Similarly, if an agency is already able to exercise discretion in applying rules through an adjudicatory
process that incorporates the safeguards of an exceptions process, and if the rules allow sufficient
discretion to treat special cases in this manner, the agency may find an exceptions process redundant.
The NLRB, for example, has no exceptions process. See Schuck, supra note 4, at G3. The formal
adjudicatory nature of the process by which this agency develops and applies rules may justify this
arrangement. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 104-13
(1981) (describing NLRB's organization and procedures); Murphy, The National Labor Relations
Board-An Appraisal, 52 MINN. L. REv. 819 (1968) (reviewing various formal and discretionary
aspects of NLRB's operation). In light of the many relevant contingencies, see supra p. 950, policy-
makers may well find it difficult to weigh the competing values in such a choice. But the availability
of an exceptions process to treat special cases should not render impermissible such functions of
prosecutorial discretion as apportioning scarce enforcement resources among cases. See Note, supra
note 3, at 636 (limited prosecutorial resources may be justification for agency's violation of own rule);
cf. Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1548-49 (1981)
(discussing deployment of limited prosecutorial resources as justification for discretion in criminal law
enforcement).
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cial deference.8 To balance the regulatory values discussed above with the
requirements of this principle, the exceptions doctrine should take the
form of a principle of statutory interpretation of an agency's authorizing
statute.88 The essence of the doctrine would be a presumption that Con-
gress intended that an exceptions process be included in a rule or set of
rules.89 The doctrine would emphasize strict regard for the specific system
87. Under this principle, courts recognize that an agency has greater technical expertise and expe-
rience in its particular field than a judge. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.)
(en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ("[S]ubstantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence
by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable .... "), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir. 1954) (L. Hand, J.) (deferring to NLRB's
"acquaintance with phenomena in this field"). For further explication of the rationale behind the
principle of deference see Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and
the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345.
88. Alternative bases for an exceptions doctrine would give inadequate weight to the principle of
deference. Courts might, for example, implement the exceptions doctrine as a constitutional require-
ment under the due process clause. The early cases upholding the constitutionality of administrative
rules, especially United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), support such a consti-
tutional doctrine, see supra note 21, as do the "irrebuttable presumption" cases, see supra note 26.
Yet the irrebuttable presumption cases, like the required waiver decisions, lack support from recent
decisions. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (declining to apply irrebuttable presumption
analysis to discrimination by university against aliens); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (de-
dining to apply irrebuttable presumption analysis to Social Security Act classification denying
"mother's insurance benefits" for widows and divorced wives of wage earners to mother of illegitimate
child). As a result, no clearly valid precedent exists to sustain such a due process doctrine. The great
weight accorded constitutional requirements could also lead courts applying a due process doctrine to
disregard valid objections to the exceptions process on grounds of efficiency or legislative purpose.
As an alternative, the exceptions doctrine might be implemented as a principle of administrative
common law. An across-the-board presumption that the exceptions process is necessary might be in-
ferred from 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982) ("Each agency shall give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."), or directly from the regulatory values
themselves. These values are "quasi-constitutional" in the sense that they reflect actual constitutional
values such as equal protection and due process, and represent fundamental objectives in current
administrative and legislative enactments. See Stewart, The Resource Allocation Role of Reviewing
Courts, in COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING: APPLICATIONS FROM PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 205 (C.
Russell ed. 1979) (discussing "quasi-constitutional values" and contending that they may serve as
independent basis for judicial decisions). Yet such a presumption in favor of the exceptions process
might still foster excessive disregard for the specialized aspects of a particular regulatory scheme or an
agency's interpretation of its own mandate. See generally Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) ("The court should . . . not stray
beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own
notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good.").
89. Courts have traditionally interpreted regulatory statutes in a way that avoids problems raised
by constitutional or "quasi-constitutional" values. Both WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), and EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), see supra note 18, arguably
result from "due process" concerns, though neither mentions due process explicitly. See 3 J. SlITHER-
LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 171 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1974) ("requirements of notice and hear-
ing may be inferred for the purpose of sustaining the constitutional validity of the grant of power,
even where the enabling statute does not expressly provide for [them]"); 2 K. DAvis, supra note 40,
at 447 (discussing statutory interpretation to require a trial-type hearing, where "the probability is
that due process is silently in the background"). The burden of proof proposed here thus represents an
equilibrium between the regulatory values, which are basic if not constitutional, and the principle of
judicial deference, which accords great weight to an agency's interpretation of its own statute. See
supra note 87.
Regulatory Exceptions
of rules at issue. 90 The failure of a regulatory statute to provide explicitly
for an exceptions process, however, would be taken as an inadvertent
omission rather than as a deliberate act. The burden of justifying the ab-
sence of an exceptions process would then pass to the agency or others
defending the rules. Those parties would have to demonstrate that the
purpose of the regulatory statute mandates exclusion of the exceptions
process, or that the administrative cost of such a process justifies a conclu-
sion that Congress did not intend to establish an exceptions process under
the statute. Such a principle of statutory interpretation should prod both
agencies and Congress to place greater emphasis on the exceptions process
as a means to treat special cases under systems of rules.91
-Jefferey M. Sellers
90. A principle of statutory interpretation, in contrast to the presumptions discussed supra note
88, incorporates greater regard for the statutory framework. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER, HART AND WEcHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTEM 770
(2d ed. 1973) ("[Sltatutory interpretation shades into [common law] judicial lawmaking on a spec-
trum, as specific evidence of legislative advertence to the issue at hand attenuates.").
91. The principle of statutory interpretation could have produced a different result in several of
the cases discussed above. The Fourth Circuit came close to applying such a doctrine explicitly in E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), affd in part and rev'd in part,
430 U.S. 112 (1977). The circuit court, relying on the many variance and exemption provisions al-
ready explicit in the statutory scheme, noted that "[p]rovisions for variances, modifications, and excep-
tions are appropriate to the regulatory process." 541 F.2d at 1028. Consistent with this assumption, it
held that "[flor all sources [of pollutants], existing and new," congressional intent required that the
regulations control only presumptively. Id. Whether the Fourth Circuit gave sufficient weight to the
agency's defense of its decision not to establish an exceptions process for new sources is unclear, since
this portion of its opinion did not explicitly address arguments by the agency. An effective rebuttal by
EPA of the prima facie case for a new source "variance" would have produced precisely the result
that the Supreme Court reached when it upheld the agency's decision not to establish the variance,
430 U.S. at 137-38. Such a principle of statutory interpretation, however, would have introduced a
bias in favor of an exceptions process that is missing from the language of the high court's opinion. It
would also have had the advantage of avoiding the arbitrary invocation of statutory language that the
Supreme Court used to justify its decision. See supra note 19.

